|
ERP
systems and the university as a “unique” organization
Neil
Pollock
Management
School, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK, and
James
Cornford
Business
School, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle, UK
Keywords
Universities, Standardization, Customization
Abstract
Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems are widely used
by large corporations around
the world. Recently, universities have turned to ERP as
a means of replacing existing management
and administration computer systems. This article provides
analysis of the rollout of an ERP
system in one particular institution in the UK, the particular
focus being on how the development,
implementation and use of both generic and university speciWc
functionality is mediated
and shaped by a fundamental and long standing tension within
universities: this is the extent
to which higher education institutions are organisations
much like any other and the extent to which
they are “unique”. The aim of this article is
not to attempt to settle this issue of similarity/difference
in one way or another. Rather, it seeks to illustrate the
value of taking discussions
of similarity relationships surrounding the university and
other organisations as the topic
of analysis. One way of working with these kinds of issues
without resolving them is to consider
their “distribution” and where ERP shifts the
responsibility for their Wnal resolution. This is a
novel and insightful way of understanding how ERP systems
are refashioning the identity of universities.
The article suggests, moreover, that ERP software is “accompanied”by
such tensions in which
ever site it is implemented. The research presented here
is based on a participant observation
study carried over the period of three years.
Similarity
relationships
It is
a truism that universities form one of the oldest established
institutions in the
western world – far older, for example, than the joint
stock company or indeed
the bureaucracy of the nation-state – and despite
changes in form, function
and fashion, the very latest universities retain some links,
however tenuous,
with their Medieval forebears. Equally, while bodies bearing
the title university
vary dramatically in terms of their structure, function
and form, the very
fact that they choose to label themselves as universities
rather than any one
of a number of other alternatives, suggests at least a desire
to capture and share
in that thousand year old tradition. On the
one hand, then, it is tempting to see the university as
something different
or set apart from other organisations – as a unique
institution in the modern
world. Balderston (1995, p. 2), for instance, describes
how historically, universities
grew as a type of institution that was, and still is to
some extent, “distinctive”
with an “autonomous place in society and the right
to choose its members,
settle its aims, and operate in its own way”. On the
other hand, it is also
clear there are many similarities between universities and
other organisations.
As Lockwood (1985, p. 29) has put it, “universities
as organisations
face many problems common to most modern organisations”, including,
for instance, the problems of co-ordinating resources, controlling costs,
of stimulating and facilitating enterprise among staff,
and so on. Thus, it might
be argued, that since universities have problems common
to a wide range
of organisations, then the standard tools of contemporary organisational
analysis and institutional management – including
computer systems
used by large corporations around the world, such as enterprise resource
planning (ERP) systems – can be similarly applied
in universities. Some
have attempted to resolve this issue of differences/similarities
in an interesting
way. Lockwood (1985, pp. 31-32), for instance, argues that
universities
are unique only to the extent they possess a certain combination
of common
characteristics which he lists as complexity of purpose,
limited measurability
of outputs, both autonomy and dependency from wider society, diffuse
structure of authority and internal fragmentation. Whereas organisations
in general might possess one or more of these characteristics or components,
it is the particular combination of the components within universities
that make universities “unique”. The
aim of this article is not to attempt to settle this issue
of similarity/difference
in one way or another (as if that was at all possible),
or try
to offer a deWnitive account of the institutional identity
and boundedness of the
university. Rather, it seeks to highlight the value of taking
the discussions
of similarity relationships surrounding the university and
other organisations
as the object of study. One way of working with these kinds
of issues
without resolving them is to consider their “distribution”
and where ERP
shifts the responsibility for their Wnal resolution. In
this article we present
evidence from the implementation, and further development,
of an ERP
system within a British university (an institution we are
calling “Big Civic”).
Here the construction of similarity/difference occurred
not simply
within
the conWnes of the project team but was also the outcome
of a set of relationships
the university has with the system, its supplier, various
internal departments,
and other institutions involved in similar implementations.
This is a
novel and insightful way of understanding how ERP systems
are refashioning
the identity of universities. We argue, moreover, that ERP software
is “accompanied” by such tensions in which ever
setting it is implemented.
The
ERP system we studied (let us call this system “Enterprise”)
has a particularly
“mature” biography (Pollock et al., 2003). Initially
conceived according
to a narrow set of assumptions about how organisations operate
(it has
its roots in manufacturing and material requirements planning
(MRP) systems),
Enterprise has been continually applied to new contexts
(i.e. Wnancial services,
public sector, healthcare and, now, higher education). In
so doing, it has
been expanded to include an ever-increasing range of organisational characteristics
and functions (Parr and Shanks, 2000). These characteristics
are embodied
in the system as modules and ready made business process templates
and, as is made clear in supplier brochures, are seen as
being applicable
to a wide variety of user organisations. In some senses,
this might be thought
of as the practical implementation of Lockwood’s (1985)
view: . .
. such systems are fundamentally based on the notion that
organisations contain common elements
and through combining the various modules or templates an
organisation can create for
itself its own “unique solution”, yet still
have a fully supported computer system in which each
individual component is “best of breed”. As we
will see, this is not, or at least not for universities,
the case.
Before
presenting our empirical material, however, it will be useful
to provide
Wrst, some further background information ERP systems, second,
the institution
and the project underway, and, Wnally, a review of the theoretical notions
and concepts that have informed this study, including a
description of the
identity of the university. Customising
an ERP system, restructuring the university The
acquisition of well-established, generic and corporate computer
systems is increasingly
common – and not just among universities. Firms and organisations,
rather than commission and build bespoke systems and packages,
are adapting general solutions to their local context (see
Brady et al., 1992).
Generic software packages, such as ERP systems, cover the
fullest range of organisational
activities and processes and are adopted with the aim of achieving
substantial cost savings as well as improved access to “tried
and tested”
solutions, new releases, and an opportunity to update procedures
and align
them with perceived “best practice”. However,
while organisations choose ERP
packages because of their economic beneWts they are potentially
a costly and
high-risk strategy. First, whereas most early applications
of IT were “discrete
technologies” applied to speciWc or closely-related
functions, ERP attempts
to integrate and link together the whole range of functions
across and organisation
(Davenport, 2000). Second, because ERP systems are built
with “generic
users” in mind (see Bansler and Havn, 1996), systems
seldom translate easily
across boundaries, whether this is between organisations
within the same
sector, between industrial sectors or between public and
private sector organisational
forms (see Walsham, 2001; Ciborra, 2000). There is often
a gulf between
the system and the speciWc contexts, practices and requirements
of particular
user organisations. Among the many issues ERP systems raise,
of particular
concern to practitioners is the choice between conducting
expensive “customisation”
work on standard solutions or undergoing unwanted organisational
change in adapting their practices to models of work and
organizational
process embedded in the software.
Customisation
and the “power of default”
While
proponents of ERP systems have argued that, in principle,
such systems have
“universal applicability” (see Lozinsky, 1998),
there is a growing body of evidence
to the contrary. Adopters often Wnd the assumptions embodied
by these
systems about the nature of organisations and the ways in
which they operate
run counter to existing structures and work practices. Davenport (1998),
for instance, describes how one company had developed a
practice of giving
its most important customers preferential treatment, which
included sometimes
shipping them products that had already been allocated to
other accounts.
Under the new ERP system, however, it no longer had the
Xexibility to process
orders in this way (see also Walsham, 2001). The
suppliers of these systems will, in truth, often acknowledge
and try to accommodate
organisational variety through the continued addition of
new and
sector speciWc modules (Scott and Kaindl, 2000). Moreover,
many of the more
local incompatibilities between the system and the organisation,
from the vendor’s
point of view, can be reconciled through customisation (Light,
2001). Indeed,
these systems are marketed on the Xexibility of their modular
design, as well
as the ability to choose from hundreds of “business
process templates”, and
the tailorability of the various parameters and settings.
A supplier brochure
describes this in more detail: From
a broad spectrum of functions and alternative business processes,
you select the modules
that you want to mould into an internally consistent organizational
system for your
company, depending on your speciWc requirements. . .We match
its core processes to your
needs by customizing additional applications, which we or
our partners implement
for you. Or your own IS staff can do the work simply and
easily with the [Supplier
SpeciWc] Development Workbench, which is an integral part
of the [Enterprise] system.
A user
organisation is thus supposed to be able to choose from
the 800-plus ready-made
business processes, some of which have already been speciWcally tailored
to match certain sectors, and then to customise locally
the resulting assemblage.
Unsurprisingly,
the reality of customising these systems is somewhat different.
Pollock (n.d.), for instance, notes some of the problems
that arise when
there are ambiguities regarding which parts of a system
can be modiWed and
those parts that cannot, or there are “blurred”
boundaries about the roles of designers
and implementers (see Trigg and Bodker, 1994). Moreover,
just as modifying
the “wrong” parts of a system can lead to problems,
so too can customising
industry standard systems “too much” (Tierney
and Williams, 1991;
Brady et al., 1992; Hanseth and Braa, 2000). Heavy customisation
can mean
that a system is taken away from supplier standards, meaning
it will be difWcult
to make use of later upgrades or new system functionality,
the reason why
many systems are acquired in the Wrst place (see Light,
2001).
Unregulated
and excessive local customisation is at one end of the scale.
At the
other end, lies the problem of systems not being tailored
at all. There is, for example,
growing evidence to suggest that because of the sheer number
of organisational
and technological discrepancies that arise during attempts
to customise
(see Hanseth and Braa, 2000; Ciborra, 2000;Walsham, 2001),
and the complexity
and time-consuming nature of each modiWcation, most adopters simply
end up Wtting their organisation to the system rather than
the other way around
(Koch, 1999; Markus et al., 2000). It seems that rather
than attempt to reconWgure
each and every aspect of a standardised systems (the various templates,
system parameters, authorisation proWles and so on), implementation
teams simply accept those “default” features
already embodied
within the system – what one author has called the
“power of default”
(see Koch, 1999).
The
university setting
Big
Civic was a pioneer in its attempt to implement an ERP system
both within
the
UK and further aWeld (see Pollock, 2000). On its Web site
for instance, it
describes
how once it had completed the project, and installed the
ERP Campus
Management
module (see below), it would be the “Wrst in the world
to have a
fully
integrated university ERP solution”. The rationale
for Big Civic
embarking
on the project, as given by the pro vice chancellor in charge
of the
implementation,
was both to replace existing systems that were seen as
“limited”
and to support a fundamental restructuring of the institution’s
information
management as recommended by a consultancy study. Related
to
this,
it was also hoped that the new Enterprise system would encourage
the
development
of procedures and practices more commonly found in large
corporations,
so called best business practice:
I think
the reason why all the bigger universities are beginning
to go towards [Enterprise], is
that
it has come out of a multi-national environment where in
essence what [multi-national
companies]
are involved in doing is having highly decentralised structures
where you’re
giving
your line managers a lot of autonomy and responsibility
within a framework of an
overall
corporate entity; where the role of higher level managers
is to have an oversight of the
business
as a whole and take strategic decisions and so on (interview
with Pro-Vice
Chancellor).
The
project involves a wide range of actors, including the university’s
management
and central administration, the software vendor itself,
and a
number
of third party consultancy companies. At the heart of Enterprise
is a
large
and complex relational database that will eventually contain
information
on the
status of staff, students, buildings, equipment, documents
and Wnancial
transactions.
The Enterprise system is produced by a large European software
producer
and includes a number of modules dealing with particular
functions
or aspects
of the university, including Wnance, human resources, project
management
and (eventually) student records. While the supplier had
little
experience
of working in a higher education setting, it had demonstrated
an
intention
to commit resources to re-developing its software for this
new market,
which
included the development of the “Campus management”
module.
The
distributon and resolution of university identity
As yet,
few Wne-grained studies of the implications of ERP systems
for
universities
have been carried out (but see Scott and Wagner (in press)
who
also
employ an actor network approach). Cunningham et al. (1998)
mention the
potential
of ERP for reshaping organisational aspects, but do not
present
empirical
evidence to illustrate or substantiate such claims. Heiskanen
et al.
(2000),
by contrast, have conducted a detailed study of the use
of software
packages
but conclude that such industry standard systems are inappropriate
as universities
as organisations are unique, particularly in terms of their
decision
making processes:
It would
seem that universities are fundamentally different from
business organisations in
their
decision making processes. Consequently the standard IS
development strategies
developed
for business may not be appropriate in institutions of higher
education (Heiskanen
et al.,
2000, p. 7).
While
we do not necessarily disagree with this view, we suggest
that the
signiWcance
of these systems would be better appreciated and understood
if we
were
to resist viewing universities (or, for that matter, computer
systems) as
stable
entities or as having characteristics that are “given
in the order of
things”
(in the manner of Lockwood (1985) or Heiskanen et al. (2000)).
Instead,
we want
to explore some of the processes that might generate these
characteristics
– i.e. the identity of the university, its decision-making
processes
and so on – as “effects”. Theoretically,
this move has most famously
been
explicated in the work of Norbert Elias, Michel Foucault,
and, more
recently,
in actor network theory, where it has been painstakingly
shown how
the
development of scientiWc, organisational and bureaucratic
processes and
practices,
simultaneously involved the development of scientiWc institutions
(Latour,
1988), organisations (Cooper and Law, 1994), and the “modern
state”
(Bowker
and Star, 1999)[1]. With this in mind, let us now turn our
focus to the
identity
of the university.
Where
is the university?
The
notion of “the university” is a notoriously
slippery one. The traditional
university
is conventionally, if mythically, thought of as a band of
scholars
coming
together in pursuit and dissemination of knowledge, governed
by a
more
or less collegiate model of organisation, based around a
complex structure
of committees
and with a high degree of individual and departmental
autonomy.
In this sense “the university” as an institution
tends to lack a clear
identity,
primarily existing in the heads of people who constitute
it and a
myriad
of locally negotiated practices and interactions. The central
social role
of the
traditional university has been to provide a place-based
“rite of passage”
for
entry into middle class professions through its undergraduate,
vocational
and
extramural provision, together with the provision of ideas-driven
“academic”
research. In institutional terms, it has thus been described
as an
exemplar
of a “loosely coupled system” (Weick, 1976)
characterised by a lack of
clearly
articulated policy and weak control over the implementation
of policy
(McNay,
1995). The traditional university as an institution, we
might say, often
appears
to be only virtually present.
This
ambiguity is apparent in the extent to which, as one moves
around a
university,
the institution of the university is always, to a greater
or lesser
extent,
“over there”. Thus for the academics in their
departments, labs and
research
centres, “the university” generally refers to
the senior management
and,
particularly, central administration. By the same token,
for the senior
management
and the administrators, “the university”which
they are seeking to
govern,
manage and administer is very clearly “out there”
in the departments,
labs
and research centres. Meanwhile, for the students, “the
university” is seen
as being
comprised of both of these groups, but once again somewhat
distanced
and
apart. “The university”, even for those who
work or study within one, is
always
“them” and never “us”. In many ways,
this distancing is
understandable.
For the academic, both status and job security are
dependent
less on their current university and more on the “invisible
college”
of academics in the same or cognate disciplines at other
institutions.
For
the institutional manager or administrator, progress depends
on interaction
with
a body which it is impossible to fully understand (for who
can understand
the
physicist, the economist and the literary theorist equally
well). And for the
student,
the duration of their sojourn in the university is typically
still a fairly
short-lived
prelude to something greater.
Our
own solution to the problem of deWning the university is
therefore not to
attempt
a general deWnition acceptable to all, but rather to accept
the complex
and
multiple meanings of the term. Following Lee (1999) and
Rappert (2001),
we argue
that one way of working with such ambiguity without attempting
to
resolve
it is to attend to its “distribution” and to
show where responsibility for
the
resolution is located[2]. In this way, we are able to understand
how, and
where,
these differences and similarities are brought into being,
in what
circumstances,
and why. It is this that leads us to draw on actor network
theory
and
the notion of “biography” introduced below,
which we think is useful in
explicating
this distribution.
Translation
and biographies
A number
of terms and concepts are synonymous with the actor-network
approach,
including viewing the world in terms of the emergence of
competing
“actor-networks”,
where various elements are brought together or “enrolled”
into
an assemblage (Latour, 1987). We emphasise, for instance,
how the
successful
realisation of differences and similarities depends on the
struggles of
actor-networks.
By this we mean that similarity and difference between
institutions
do not exist out there waiting to be found but depend on
the two
things
as being constructed or translated in such a way (see Pinch,
1993). As
part
of this network building, there are continuous processes
of multilateral
change
or “translation”, where one actor will attempt
to channel the goals of
others
in new directions. And, in doing so, an actor will often
Wnd her own route
re-directed
when she encounters, for instance, a particular technological
“biography”.
The
actor-network approach has fruitfully suggested that it
is not only
human
beings, but also “things” that can undertake
the required work of
translation
of interest necessary to build and sustain actor networks,
and thus
non-humans
should also attain the status of actors (Callon, 1986).
In this sense,
we want
to capture something of the history or “biography”
of these systems –
both
what they bring with them and what this means for the new
sets of users.
Appadurai
(1992) and particularly Kopytoff (1992), writing from the
perspective
of material culture, use the notion of biography to describe
established
artefacts as they move around and are adapted and redeWned
according
to the needs of each new place. As Kopytoff emphasises:
. .
.what is signiWcant about the adoption of alien objects
– as of alien ideas – is not the fact
that
they are adopted, but the way they are culturally redeWned
and put to use (Kopytoff,
1992,
p. 67).
The
biography of a car in Africa, to use the example given in
Kopytoff’s (1992)
paper,
reveals enormous amounts of information about “the
relationship of the
seller
to the buyer, the uses to which the car is regularly put,
the identity of its
most
frequent passengers and those who borrow it”, and
so on. Crucially, all
these
details would “reveal an entirely different biography
from that of a
middle-class
American or Navajo, or French peasant car” (Kopytoff,
1992, p.
67).
Through
building on Appadurai’s (1992) and Kopytoff’s
(1992) notion of
biography
we attempt to highlight the “accumulated history”
of an ERP system
and
how this continues to inXuence the structures and practices
of later
adopters.
In the following discussion we identity how this occurs
in at least
three
ways: through its all encompassing nature, ERP overwhelms
implementation
teams such that they have little option but to implement
“default”
settings; such systems are not simply “put to use”
but are, where
possible,
continually adapted though this is something of a burden;
and
because
ERP suppliers’ look for commonalties as opposed to
diversity in
organisations,
systems are accompanied by tensions concerning similarities
and
differences. The beneWts of a biographies approach, therefore,
combined
with
the actor-network perspective, is that it sensitises us
to these tensions as
these
artefacts move around (across national borders or the boundaries
of
several
industrial sectors) and are adapted and redeWned according
to the needs
of each
new setting. This echoes Williams (1997) who has criticised
those
approaches
that over emphasise the Xexibility of technology, as well
as its
potential
for re-adaptation to a new setting, without considering
the role the
history
of the artefact plays in current usage[3].
Methodology
We conducted
ethnographic research over a three-year period at Big Civic,
a
large
red-brick university in the north of England and to a lesser
extent at a
large
ERP supplier. The study was part of a wider Economic &
Social Research
Council
study on virtual universities, where we were investigating
the
implications
of ICTs for the reshaping of universities (see Cornford
and Pollock,
2003).
From our point of view, the virtual university is not just
a matter of
“distance”
or “Xexible” teaching and learning systems.
As we understood it, the
virtual
university is also very much concerned with mundane projects
such as
administration
(Wnance, personnel, purchasing; estates, etc.); student
recruitment
and alumni management; research networks; library systems;
and
so on, and because of the way the virtual university extends
across every
aspect
of institutions, this has important implications for the
very nature of the
university.
Readings (1996), for instance, describes this, in broad
terms, as a
transformation
from the “cultural” to the “technological”
university.
A further
assumption throughout the conception of this project was
that, as
ICT
projects are introduced into the university system, their
consequences are
the
outcome of a complex process of negotiation, involving interactions
within
a heterogeneous
network of actors, artifacts, and systems. Our interest
was in
understanding
the micro level shaping of new technological systems and
the
interactions
between these and the wider processes of the university.
In this
respect,
right from the outset, we considered the design and implementation
of
the
ERP system to be concerned not only with narrow technical
work (such as
the
writing of computer code), but also the production of the
very university. In
terms
of “what” and “who” we looked at,
we drew lessons again from the actor
network
tradition. In terms of what should be studied, Latour (1987)
has
famously
advocated that technologies should be studied not as Wnished
artefacts
but “in the making”, arguing that, by studying
them in this way, the
“messiness”
is still there for all to see. By messiness he means not
only those
issues
identiWed by the researcher but those that arise during
the building and
implementation
of ICT projects. We studied, therefore, projects as they
were
actually
being planned, built, and used. In terms of who we studied,
Latour
(1987)
has also argued that we should “follow the actors”
whether they be
human
or non-human. In this sense, our focus was directly on the
ERP system.
During
the research we employed a wide range of qualitative methods,
which
included direct and participative observation of “strategy”
and technical
meetings
and user testing sessions. Within Big Civic, we observed
the weekly
“Sponsors
group” meetings where day-to-day technical and organisational
decisions
were made. The monthly “strategy group” meetings
were observed
where
issues more relevant to the future direction of the university
were the
focus.
Project away days, comprising mainly those technical and
administrative
staff involved in the actual implementation of the project
were
also attended.Within the ERP supplier one testing sessions
was observed,
where
technical teams and “end-users” from the various
pilot and early adopter
sites
gathered together to provide input and help shape the software.
During
this
session, and at a subsequent workshop we also met and talked
with
programmers
and analysts from the technology supplier as well as staff
from
the
other participating universities. We were also able to conduct
a number of
individual
and group-based semi-structured interviews, as well as more
informal
discussions with members of the Big Civic technical team
and user
community.
A number of focus groups were also conducted with the users
of
the
system. Finally, supporting material, such as meeting notes,
e-mail
exchanges
and reports were also collected and analysed.
We now
turn to Big Civic’s engagement with Enterprise, where
we organise
our
discussion around various aspects of the system’s
biography. First, we
consider
how the university (its hierarchy, senior management team,
and
various
committees) attempted to take customisation decisions. Our
argument
here
is that these systems complicate this process such that
it is difWcult to
avoid
implementing a system’s default settings (i.e. accumulated
history).
Deferring
decisions
When
the chips are down and you’ve got to deliver, the
collegiate model doesn’t work
(Enterprise
Project Director).
When
we conducted the Wrst part of our research, Big Civic was
in the process
of implementing
the Wnancial, human resource and project management
modules,
prior to adopting the student management module. As already
mentioned,
the implementation was being handled by a project team made
up
of university
staff and external consultants from small organisations
specialising
in the implementation of Enterprise. On a number of occasions,
members
of the team met with the “faculty support team”
(members of central
departments,
such as Wnance, attached to the faculty) and representatives
of
academic
departments where they were going to pilot the new system.
We
directly
observed some of these meetings.
During
one of the sessions, the consultants had a set of “workXow
process
diagrams”,
which describe the proposed sequences of events by which
tasks,
such
as setting up a research account, raising a purchase order
or issuing an
invoice,
would take place within the new system. Each step of the
process was
described
in detailed Xow diagrams, indicating which parts of the
process take
place
“on the system” and which take place “off
the system”, as well as
constraints
on who can undertake which tasks. Each of the workXow process
diagrams
is discussed with the departmental representatives and faculty
team.
The
aim of the session was to clarify the workXow processes,
iron out any
problems
which arise, and identify who does what.
As the
meeting moves through the workXow diagrams a number of basic
rules
of the system are made clear (for example, two separate
logins are
required
to complete each and every external transaction –
the same “login”
cannot
order and receive goods). At some points the workXow diagrams
are
amended
to better reXect the current practice (although this amendment
tends
to happen
more with “off system” events). At a number
of points in the process
it becomes
clear that there is more than one way, in current practice,
in which a
particular
step in the process was being handled. If the issue cannot
be resolved
one
way or another, the consultant leading the meeting identiWes
the issue as “a
matter
for policy”, a matter on which a deWnitive ruling
must be given by the
university
centrally.
What
appears to be happening here, as the computer system is
rolled-out
is a standardisation of working practices and roles. Moreover,
as
Enterprise
makes visible the variety of local practices and where these
cannot
be reconciled with the system (and thus with each other),
this goes
on to
generate a constant Xow of “demands for policy”[4].
Indeed from later
interviews
with members of the team we know that there were hundreds
of
such
requests for a central policy decision; these were logged
by the team
in a
database and passed onto the senior management to resolve.
In
principle
then, the process not only sees the “tightening up”
of roles and
procedures
but it also demands a tightening up of policy which will
apply
not
locally, but across the whole university. We might say that
these
customisation
procedures involve both the building of a university speciWc
system
and the re-building of the university: the roll out of Enterprise
is
requiring
the simultaneous rollout of a new (and more standardised)
institution
to host it (Cornford, 2000).
This
“co-production” of system and university is
a complex process,
however.
As we found out in a later phase, these demands for policy
were so
copious
that many of the requests simply remained on the database
without
senior
management ever having the time to deal with them. The committee
overseeing
the system roll-out (made up of a number of pro-vice chancellors,
the
registrar, bursar, various deans, and senior administrators)
met once a
week
intending to resolve these demands but, as described by
the project
administrator:
“the Committee were getting 20 iss |